Abstract: This article argues that, although at times it is necessary to de ne HRD for political reasons, there is a strong case that HRD should not be de ned on philosophical, theoretical and practical grounds. To proffer de nitions of HRD is to misrepresent it as a thing of being rather than a process of becoming. De ning the eld also runs the risk of disengaging from the moral dimension of HRD.
Setting the scene
In the early 1990s I launched an MSc in HRD (by research) in the Department of Management Learning at Lancaster University. The programme was designed to lead to both professional and academic quali cations for international cohorts of senior HRD professionals. In the rst workshop of each cohort, the participants were getting their bearings -feeling what the course might be like. Two months later, after people had returned to work and started to re ect upon links between the academic and professional sides of their lives, they attended the second workshop. It was here that the de ning of HRD became paramount in most people's minds. It was as if they believed that they could not progress until they knew what HRD 'is'. They believed that through this knowledge their future study and work roles would be laid out in front of them, such that, so long as they knew where the path was, they could achieve excellence through sheer hard work. These traditional views shifted quite rapidly, but for a couple of days it was as if they thought that I, their programme designer and leader, was deliberately and maliciously preventing them from achieving, by refusing to de ne HRD for them.
This programme generated signi cant income and proved to be extremely successful with the students, many of whom keep in touch and say that it has fundamentally changed their lives. About 85 per cent obtained promotion or changed jobs during or directly after the programme. All participants had to have at least ve years' professional experience, and, even though about a quarter came with little academic experience, the majority of students achieved exceptionally good academic results, with about a fifth subsequently registering for their PhD. On all the normal criteria it was considered to be an extremely successful programme, yet, despite this, the programme was short-lived and recruitment was terminated after only four cohorts. One reason for this might be because it adopted a philosophy and practice fundamentally different from that of normal academe.
The philosophical case for refusing to de ne HRD
I designed the programme shortly after I joined Lancaster University, having previously spent twenty years working for others and myself in the eld. Most of what had been written about HRD at that time did not really reflect my own professional experiences, and therefore I was cynical about regurgitating the literature in the knowledge that it was a chimera. I therefore designed my Master's programme to re ect the way in which I understood my role as an HRD professional and as an educator of others. It seemed to me that in my professional life, while I carried a central core of understanding from each experience that came my way, I, and my understanding, shifted and changed according to that experience -and each experience influenced, and was in uenced by, future experiences. I could never say 'this is the organization', 'this is my role' and 'this is what I am doing' as I could never manage to complete or nalize any of these states. Similarly, as an educator, I could not identify with any rm body of knowledge and say 'this is what is needed'. I could see that people needed knowledge, but that most of what they needed would be situation specific: the knowledge needed by an Angolan participant would be very different from that needed by someone working in Hong Kong; working multi-nationally required different knowledge and skills than working with small and medium-sized enterprises; working in the voluntary sector appeared fundamentally different from working with the corporate sector, and so on. I could see that people needed different knowledge and skills, and that they would need to shift and change to emerge into new roles and selves. There did seem to me to be some meta-level areas of activity in what I did, and it was these that I tried to capture as workshop topics.
I therefore designed a programme that avoided speci cation or, at least, the specification beyond basic structure and process. These were the areas of focus in the different workshops, the form, but not the content, of the assessed research projects and international placement, and the form of process that occurred over the different days of each workshop. The programme was not completely open as participants derived implicit delineations of the area to be studied from the brochure and the interviews. As I shall discuss later, it could be argued that there was an overriding de nition in practice, but there was no set content or syllabus, and no area that had to be known to satisfy assessment criteria. Some details of the programme are contained within Appendix 1. I designed the course like this because it felt the best way to foster the growth of re ective practitioners able to develop and marry best practice with academic credibility and personal strength. This was, however, a challenge to the 'academic' mindset.
By 'academic mindset' I am referring to the academic world-view -the archetype or myth of academe -the 'norm' (which is, of course, never really lived just because it is so 'normal'). Elsewhere (Lee 1988 ) I have discussed the nature of the archetype, and tried to convey its all-pervading in uence. When we think of an academic person, or academe in general, we tend to envision ivory towers, theoretical debate, careful experimentation, scienti c method and so on. These views even permeate applied areas of study such as management and HRD. As Boyacigiller and Adler (1991) point out, the bulk of early management research was done on (and in) white US bureaucratic organizations and our current understandings of management theory and practice are derived from this culturally speci c and non-representational sample, and the very nature of this compounded the bias. Early research was assumed to apply to all management, and it was also assumed that management was a singular global concept without national or situation-speci c boundaries, that there were right and wrong ways of managing and that it was possible to derive a single global set of tenets for best practice. These views are still around and actively promoted, despite ample evidence of their fallacy (Lee 1995) .
More generally, academe is normally associated with 'scientism' -a belief in the supremacy of reductive rationalistic scientific thinking. This approach pervades academic theorizing and shapes and in uences all forms of knowledge considered acceptable by the academic community, and thus is self-ful lling. Those who do not conform to the control mechanisms of format, style and scienti c method are (normally quite politely) told that they are not suf ciently 'scholarly'. This is one way of looking at the world. It has an ancient and strong lineage, but there are other forms of world-view.
As Chia states:
Contemporary Western modes of thought are circumscribed by two great and competing pre-Socratic cosmologies or 'world-views', which provided and continue to provide the most general conceptual categories for organizing thought and directing human effort. Heraclitus, a native of Ephesus in ancient Greece, emphasized the primacy of a changeable and emergent world while Parmenides, his successor, insisted upon the permanent and unchangeable nature of reality. (Chia 1997) Parmenides' view of reality is re ected in the continued dominance of the belief that science constitutes, by far, the most valuable part of human learning and accomplishment. He argues that this leads to an atomistic conception of reality in which clear-cut, de nite things are deemed to occupy clear-cut de nite places in space and time. Thus causality becomes the conceptual tool used for linking these isolates, and the state of rest is considered normal while movement is considered as a straightforward transition from one stable state to another.
This being ontology is what provides the metaphysical basis for the organization of modern thought and the perpetration of a system of classi catory taxonomies, hierarchies and categories which, in turn, serve as the institutionalised vocabulary for representing our experiences of reality. A representationalist epistemology thus ensues in which formal knowledge is deemed to be that which is produced by the rigorous application of the system of classi cations on our phenomenal experiences in order to arrive at an accurate description of reality. (Chia 1997: 74) A being ontology is conceptualized with one 'true' reality, the units of which are tied together in a causal system. The truth is out there, we just have to nd it. In contrast, the Heraclitean viewpoint offers a becoming ontology in which 'how an entity becomes constitutes what the actual entity is; so the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its being is constituted by its becoming. This is the principle of process. . . . the ux of things is one ultimate generalisation around which we must weave our philosophical system' (Whitehead 1929: 28, 240) . Cooper (1976) suggests that, within such a process epistemology, the individuals involved feel themselves to be signi cant nodes in a dynamic network and are neither merely passive receivers nor dominant agents imposing their preconceived scheme of things on to that which they apprehend. All are the parts of the whole, and the parts, and the whole, change and develop together. From this point of view, there are both one and many realities, in which I myself come into being both through interacting with and being constituted within them, and the knowing of these realities is never final or nished.
Integral to 'living' within a process epistemology is the personal quality of what might be called 'hanging loose', or 'negative capability', as described by the early nineteenth-century English poet John Keats: 'And at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement . . . I mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason' (Keats 1817 ). This quality, one of resisting conceptual closure, and thereby creating the necessary 'space' for the formulation of personal insights and the development of foresight and intuition, is a quality that is vital for counselling and other helping professions, and one that 'should' be within the remit of HRD professionals. All my experience in HRD and life (not that I can easily separate them) points me to the belief in a world of becoming, one of process epistemology and negative capability. It could be that I am out of step with the 'real world', but I suggest that the Parmenidean house of cards that we construct around us to provide clarity, certainty and delineation will tumble in the wind of close examination. This house of cards stands on the strength of unique de nitions by which every concept has its own, rightful and static place in the order of things. In contrast, from the Heraclitean perspective, the meaning and boundary of concepts is negotiable. In the following section I shall briefly report on previous work I have done with the notion of development, and illustrate that, despite being central to our ideas of HRD, even that concept is debatable.
The theoretical case for refusing to de ne HRD
Most would agree that, to be meaningful, the de nition of something needs to encapsulate the properties or qualities of that which is being de ned, such that it can be recognized uniquely from the de nition and thereby distinguished from those that are not being de ned. This sort of description of what a de nition might be is, in itself, one of being rather than becoming. We could, however, say that a de nition of something need not be xed or permanent, but, instead, it could take the form of a working de nition. If enough people use a word in a particular way, and know what each other means by it, more or less, then there is tacit agreement about the meaning of that word and its qualities, such that it could be deemed to be becoming de ned. We might, therefore, get a rough feeling for a word by looking at the way in which it is used. In Lee (1997a) I report an attempt I made to develop a working de nition of the word 'development'. I examined promotional literature aimed at HRD professionals and found four different ways in which the word 'development' was used: development as maturation, as shaping, as a voyage and as emergent.
In the rst approach that I identi ed, development as maturation was used as if to refer to a pre-determined stage-like and inevitable progression of people and organizations. Development is seen as an inevitable unfolding, and thus the developmental force is the process itself, which, in turn, de nes the endpoint. The system, be it an individual, a group or an organization, is seen as being a coherent entity with clearly de ned boundaries existing within a predictable external environment. The organization is discussed as if it were a single living element, whose structures, existence and change are capable of being completely understood through suf cient expert analysis. Concepts such as empowerment and change agency are irrelevant in an approach that is essentially founded upon social determinism, with no place for unpredictable events or freedom of individual choice.
In the second, development as shaping, people are seen as tools who can be shaped to t the organization. Here, development is still seen to have known end-points, but these are defined by someone or something external to the process of development. The organization is strati ed and senior management define the end point for junior management -the wishes of the corporate hierarchy create the developmental force. This approach assumes that there is something lacking, some weakness or gap, that can be added to or lled by the use of the appropriate tools or blueprint, and that such intervention is necessary. Individuals, including their aspirations and their values, as well as their skills, are malleable units that can be moulded to suit the wider system. Empowerment and individual agency can be part of the developmental agenda, but not in their own right. They are acceptable developmental end points only if rati ed by senior management: empowerment becomes a tool to enhance performance and decision making.
Development as a voyage is as a life-long journey upon uncharted internal paths in which individuals construe their own frames of reference and place their view of self within this, such that each of us construct our own version of reality in which our identity is part of that construct. This is described as an active process in which the individual is continually re-analysing their role in the emergence of the processes of which they are part. In so doing they are also confronting their own ideas, unsurfaced assumptions, biases and fears while maintaining a core of ethicality and strong self-concept (Adler 1974) . Development involves a transformative shift in approach that enables critical observation and evaluation of the experience, such that the learner is able to distance themselves from it rather than replay it. Experiencing becomes a way of restoring meaning to life (Vasilyuk 1984) . The external world (including organization and management) might mirror or catalyse development, but it is the individual who is the sole owner and clear driving force behind the process. Empowerment would be within the individual's own terms, and might have little regard for organizational objectives.
Development as emergent is the fourth approach that I identified. Here development is seen to arise out of the messy ways by which societal aspiration becomes transformed into societal reality. 'The individual's unique perceptions of themselves within a social reality which is continuously socially (re)constructed' (Checkland 1994) ; in which 'individuals dynamically alter their actions with respect to the ongoing and anticipated actions of their partners' (Fogel 1993: 34) ; and in which they negotiate a form of communication and meaning speci c and new to the group and relatively un-accessible or un-describable to those who were not part of the process (Lee 1994) . Selfhood is a dynamic function of the wider social system, be it a family grouping, a small or mediumsized enterprise, a large bureaucracy, or a nation, or parts of each, and, as that system transforms, so do all the participants. Emergent development of the group-as-organization is seen to be no different from the development of any social system, and is not consistently driven by any single sub-system, be it senior management or the shop-floor. Discussion about planned top-down or bottom-up change is irrelevant, as the words themselves imply some sort of structure to the change. This approach is, of course, in direct con ict with traditional ideas that organizational change is driven by senior management. However, Romanelli and Tushman (1994) offer empirical support for rapid, discontinuous transformation in organizations being driven by major environmental changes.
It would be very simple to place these in a nice two-by-two matrix, as in Figure 1 . The two-by-two matrix is pervasive and well understood in management, but it is a tool of being, rather than becoming. The lines are solid and impermeable, the categories xed. Instead, the Venn diagram in Figure 2 helps us imagine these different views of development as areas of concentration, in which it is as if the most concentrated 'essence' of that which we are examining is in the centre of the area, and, as it diffuses outward, it mingles with the essences of the other areas.
Despite nding alternative ways of representing these ndings, which might help address the problem of how to represent the sorts of working de nitions associated with becoming, we cannot avoid the fact that there appear to be four fundamentally different working definitions of development. Each of these carries with it a particular view of organization, and of the nature and role of HRD, and is used under different circumstances. When talking of our own with other KNOWN UNKNOWN END-POINT development we normally address it as if it were a voyage. When senior managers talk of organizational development they normally talk of it as if it were shaping. When social theorists talk of development they normally adopt a maturational or emergent perspective, depending upon their theoretical bent. Development is clearly not a unitary concept.
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The professional case for refusing to de ne HRD
The many ways in which the word 'development' can be used indicate the many different roles that the professional developer might adopt. For example, the role of the developer in the maturational system has the sureness of the (relatively) uninvolved expert consultant who charts the inevitable unfolding of the stages. The developer within a shaped system is the process expert who can, not only clearly help senior management identify an enhanced future, but also apply the tools necessary to ensure that such a future is achieved. Such developers purport to sell a better, and otherwise unobtainable, view of the future to individuals, groups and organizations plus the blueprint to get there. Those who are being developed are encouraged or moulded to meet the end criteria, regardless of whether such criteria are enhanced skills, positive attitudes or the achievement of corporate objectives. The role of the developer within the system as voyage is one of helping others to help themselves (see, for example, Rogers 1951 Rogers , 1959 . In this case the developer brings expert skills that help the individual recognize their self-imposed bounds and widen their horizons, but does so without calling upon the power of expertise that describes a particular path and endpoint as best for the individual concerned. In emergent systems there is little role for a developer, as the developer holds no unique or special status. Developers are as similar and as different as each other member is, and, although they perhaps have fewer vested interests in political machinations (and thus might be able to view circumstances more objectively), they are as directly involved in the life of the organization as any of the individuals they are supporting in co-development.
Let us step back for a bit, take a Parmenidean view of the world and examine what is meant by the definition of HRD. In this world-view we have the two-by-two matrix and four different de nitions of the word development, only one of which can be what we really mean, while the other three need to be renamed. When we talk about 'human resource' development however, the situation becomes clearer. A 'human resource' is a commodity -something to be shaped and used at the will and needs of the more powerful. The role of the HRD professional is clear and, by implication, so is the nature of organization and management. Senior management set the objectives within a clearly de ned organizational structure, in which HRD is a subset of the larger HRM function.
If we accept the common meaning of the words, then there is no alternative to HRD as an activity and profession in which development is about shaping individuals to t the needs of the organization, as de ned by senior management. Integrity, ethics and individual needs are not important within this conceptualization, and need be considered only if the circumstances call for hypocritical lip service to them. A Parmenidean de nition of HRD, therefore, might be along the lines of 'the shaping of the employees to t the needs of the employer'. This approach is described as performance improvement by Weinberger (1998) in her examination of theories of HRD, derived mainly from US literature. It is less prevalent in other countries (Geppert and Merkens 1999; Grieves and Redman 1999) and, interestingly, most human resource professionals (including those in the US) do not describe their own work in this way (Claus 1998; Sambrook 2000) . They, and the professional bodies are increasingly paying attention to the ethical aspects of the profession. Some might still see HRD in this way, but, for many, the profession has slowly moved on to incorporate notions of integrity and ethics, and also to re ect, at least in part, the notion that people are central to the organization, and thus the strategic role that their development can play. There is, however, a strong drive to define HRD, particularly within the professional and quali cation-awarding bodies in the eld of practice. They need to do so for political reasons -in order to patrol their boundaries, maintain their standards and bolster their power base. The professional bodies have, in general, abandoned (at least in part) theoretically derived de nitions of HRD and instead adopted a practice-based view, in which they attempt to promote what they see as 'best practice' through the establishment of their professional standards. These standards do not necessarily re ect what is happening in practice, but instead mirror what the professional bodies would like to see happening. As illustrated in Lee et al. (1996) , standardization across disparate systems of HRD is likely to have been achieved through cultural imposition, with the accepted standards or de nition in practice belonging to those cultures with the loudest voices. Even if the rhetoric is of the dominant culture, the practice often remains that of the hidden, or underlying culture (Lee 1998) . Clearly, professional and quali cation-awarding bodies do provide de nitions of HRD, and these de nitions are generally suitable to meet their political needs, but this localized and self-serving activity is fundamentally different from that of trying to understand or encapsulate the eld of knowledge and activity that is HRD. Perhaps the only way to address the need to encapsulate what is meant by HRD is to draw permeable outlines around this complex of activities that we all know and, for want of any other term, choose to call HRD.
The practical reason for refusing to de ne HRD
The idea of a generally acceptable de nition of HRD achieved via the processes of standardization becomes particularly unrealistic when we look at the degree of variation in practice across the globe. As McLean and McLean in their article in this issue of Human Resource Development International (2001) demonstrate, it is simply not feasible to seek global standardization or definition based upon current practice. They conclude that de nitions of HRD are in uenced by a country's value system, and the point of the life-cycle of the eld of HRD in that country, and that the perception and practice of HRD differ according to the status of the organization whether it be local or multinational. We can proffer, with some accuracy and completeness, localized de nitions in practice or working definitions. However, descriptions of current practice become increasingly meaningless as the variation in practice increases. Furthermore, as soon as these de nitions are encased in course brochures, syllabuses, professional standards, organizational literature or other such statements of fact, they stop becoming and are. Thus the very act of defining the area runs the risk of strangling growth in the profession by stipulating so closely what the practice of HRD is, or should be. In consequence it is unable to become anything else, and so we reach the heart of the argument.
HRD theorists and professionals are increasingly talking and acting as if the process that we call HRD is dynamic and emergent. Organizational theory and HRD theory are starting to explore areas of complexity, and the notion of process itself. In order to accommodate the variation they found in de nitions of HRD, McLean and McLean offer a global processual de nition, namely:
Human resource development is any process or activity that, either initially or over the long term, has the potential to develop adults' work-based knowledge, expertise, productivity and satisfaction, whether for personal or group/team gain, or for the bene t of an organization, community, nation or, ultimately, the whole of humanity.
Even such a global de nition, however, does not meet everybody's requirements -why is it limited to adults? What of all the child workers in the world? The authors did not include them in the de nition as they considered the fact of child labour to be one of the negative aspects of HRD practice. Thus the de nition is really a statement of how the authors would like the eld to become, and not how it is.
Heraclites and moral responsibility
The views of Heraclitus and Parmenides could be seen merely as two philosophical stances, with little to do with the bottom line of teaching people about making money through managing people in organizations. However, this is a limited view of the eld, the theory, the practice and the role of HRD, as it focuses upon one particular culturally speci c and dominant way of working and end product. From the Parmenidean perspective, no other viewpoint captures the essence of existence, yet from the Heraclitean perspective the Parmenidean view could be one among many -all of which together comprise existence. Therefore, despite the dominant focus, in the West at least, on scientistic de nition and measurable outcomes, a broader view of the eld shows that the practice or the 'doing' of whatever we mean by HRD is also a process of becoming. There are parallels here between this and the emergent system of development I describe above. This system re ects the messy ways by which societal aspiration becomes transformed into societal reality. Society develops with no clear end-point and with its emergent activities as the drive behind change, rather than the edicts of the hierarchy (Lee 1997b) . From this perspective, HRD could be seen as that which is in the processual bindings of the system, which links the needs and aspirations of the shifting elements of the system, between and across different levels of aggregation, as they are in the process of becoming. Yet, while these words are suf ciently general to describe the process of socialization, they are not per se a de nition of HRD.
To summarize this point, acknowledgement of the Heraclitean cosmology as a descriptor of the metaphysical basis of existence carries with it a moral responsibility that is not entailed by the Parmenidean cosmology. The act of de nition, for the followers of Parmenides, is that of clarifying what exists. This might be complicated or problematic, but its moral valency is no different from that of emphasizing or copying the lines of a line drawing. It is just describing what already is. In contrast, the act of de nition within the Heraclitean cosmology is equivalent to the act of creation. To de ne is to intervene in the process of becoming, it is to assert a right way and what should occur. It is to make moral judgements about what is good or bad, and to state these is to attest not only to their legitimacy, but also to the superior power or higher status of the attester. To de ne is to take the moral high ground and to assert one's power, and, by doing so, it is to deny the right of others to impose their own view on the becoming of HRD.
The world in which we move is political -all our actions and inactions can be seen as statements of power, but in the Heraclitean cosmos we are responsible for the exercise of that power in a way that does not occur in the Parmenidean cosmos. My attempts to maintain a space of negative capability and lack of de nition within the Master's programme in HRD that I described earlier was more than an educative ploy. It was an attempt to ensure that each person developed their own, emergent view of HRD, rather than adopting the one propounded by teacher, which they would end up wearing like an old, ill-tting raincoat. In this way, HRD was different for each person and emerged out of their experiences: 'It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, nor even of activity in experience. Everything depends upon the quality of experience which is had . . . every experience lives in further experiences' (Dewey 1938) . I was lucky to be able to run my Master's programme as I did for four cohorts. Many higher education institutions would neither have countenanced it nor accepted its notion of self-generating content. Having ensured that its systems of veri cation and quality management were suf cient, the university was happy for it to continue inde nitely. However, its fate was sealed by a replay of the philosophical debate that took place two and a half thousand years ago in Ancient Greece. My Heraclitean vision for HRD lost out to a fear of difference and a desire to control the uncontrollable. While acknowledging how very hard it is at times to live in a Heraclitean world, I wish to redress the balance and propose that, certainly as far as HRD is concerned, there is no alternative. I shall not de ne HRD because it is inde nable, and to attempt to de ne it is only to serve the political or social needs of the minute -to give the appearance of being in control. Instead, I suggest we seek to establish, in a moral and inclusive way, what we would like HRD to become, in the knowledge that it will never be, but that we might thus in uence its becoming.
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Appendix 1: outline of the MSc HRD (by research)
The programme consisted of eight four-day workshops, over one and a half years, and was assessed through three guided work-based research projects, an international placement, a learning log and a dissertation.
The process of each workshop followed the Kolb model, but shifted daily between a focus on the academic [theory], followed by [reflection] on the professional self within group, and then a return to the focus upon the individual [planning] , before the return to work [experience] . Specialists were invited during the rst two days of each workshop and were asked to present different views to the group about the workshop topic, with speci c instructions to be controversial and to follow their pet theories. For each half day the group lived in the world of that specialist and, given the diversity of each group, there was lots of discussion and hard questioning. I would refuse to clarify, and insist that each person had to come to their own decisions on the differing views presented. I was very determined in ensuring that the third day shifted to one of no content. It was called 'academic debate' as it was set aside for the group to work with the ideas from the previous two days and with their own processes, contextualizing theory with practice. This was, initially, hard for the participants, and proved to be particularly hard for those academic co-tutors with no counselling experience.
The majority of participants came from pressured lives in the world of business where they had to be doing something. Quite often the group got stuck, and occasionally I would jump in with some exercise or idea to shift them, but despite the real pain sometimes associated with the processes of self within group, evaluations show that all participants valued this creation of a re ective space in this way.
While the whole programme was based on principles of action learning (Lee 1996) , the fourth day made this more explicit. The group split into sub-groups of about six people each, and these were run as facilitated action learning sets. Each person would have about an hour (even if they said they did not want it) in which to address whatever issues they wished. These normally started as work issues, but quickly shifted to individual or group issues, and then, over the next year, moved increasingly towards issues associated with completing the dissertation.
This programme generated its own content and, while the process was structured, the majority of the knowledge was not. Participants had full responsibility for their own work, and the tutors acted as facilitators in order to ensure negative capability rather than closure.
